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La convergence de la pragmatique et de la recherche en acquisition d'une langue seconde a attiré de 
nombreux projets de recherchent qui se sont focalisés principalement sur la notion de pragmatique 
interlangue, soit les phénomènes d'interférence interlangue – ou encore d'influence cross-linguistique 
comme elle est parfois nommée – susceptible d'influencer les processus pragmatiques. Dans cet article, 
nous explorons une autre dimension de la pragmatique de langue seconde en nous penchant sur des 
processus pragmatiques de bas niveaux qui contribuent à la saturation de la forme propositionnelle 
d'un énoncé. Spécifiquement, nous nous concentrons sur deux types de processus de 
désambiguïsation de référent qui sont a priori identiques en L1 (Allemand) et en L2 (Anglais). Nous 
présentons deux paradigmes expérimentaux dans lesquels les participants doivent désambiguïser les 
référents d'énoncés EFL. La perspective adoptée est doublement cognitive en ce sens que nous nous 
intéressons à l'impact cognitif de la L2 sur l'aptitude à tirer des inférences (explicatures) de bas niveau, 
et que nous étudions les corrélations entre les dimensions cognitives du vieillissement et la performance 
obtenue par nos participants dans ces explicatures référentielles tout au long de la vie. Nos résultats, 
conformes en cela à des études précédentes en L1, montrent que les processus pragmatiques simples 
de bas niveau sont hautement sensible à la charge cognitive à laquelle le sujet est soumis. En 
conséquence, la performance est significativement affectée en L2 aussi bien en termes d'exactitude 
que de coût cognitif. Par ailleurs, cette même sensibilité à la charge cognitive est reflétée dans la 
dégradation observée avec le vieillissement. Enfin, même si les généralisations précédentes 
s'appliquent aux différents types d'explicatures référentielles testées, ces types semblent néanmoins 
générer des profils distincts lorsqu'ils sont corrélés avec l'âge des participants.   
Mots-clés: pragmatique, attribution de référent, acquisition d'une langue seconde, processus 
cognitifs, vieillissement 
1. Introduction
The topic of language learning and age has gained much attention not only 
within the scientific community but also among lay people, even influencing 
school curricula that cater to bilingual education. This chapter deals with one 
aspect of language learning that is all the while often neglected, namely 
language learning and pragmatics. In doing so, it shall focus on disambiguation 
processes across the lifespan, more specifically reference assignment. How do 
L2 learners assign reference in ambiguous contexts? How does this compare 
to their behavior in L1? Does their performance in both their L1 and L2 change 
with age? And what implications does this change have on our understanding 
of language learning and language teaching? This chapter shall thus describe 
two experimental setups designed to help answer these questions.  
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2. Second language acquisition, aging and pragmatics 
There have been numerous studies dealing with Second Language Acquisition 
(SLA) and age as well as SLA and pragmatics. The scientific discourse on both 
subjects allows us to explore their interface and view them in light of recent 
findings in the field of cognitive linguistics and of reference assignment. This 
chapter broadly represents an interdisciplinary approach integrating questions 
from SLA, linguistics and age as well as pragmatic linguistics. The following 
shall outline different points of view that underlie this chapter's scientific 
approach.  
2.1 SLA and pragmatics 
The significance of pragmatic phenomena for learning as well as teaching 
languages has been displayed in the field of interlanguage pragmatics, 
exemplified through the work by Schmidt (1983), Kasper & Blum-Kulka (1993), 
Kasper & Schmidt (1996) and more recently Kasper and Roever (2005). 
However, due to its historicity, as e.g. described by Hinkel (2005), much of the 
early work in applied linguistics, which came about as a result of increasing 
enrollment numbers of non-native speaking students of English in the U.S., 
focuses on learners' learning experience from a socio-cultural point of view. 
Rose (2005) e.g. synthesizes the research in the field and, on a very basic level, 
questions whether pragmatic is at all "teachable" (ibid. 390). While he concludes 
that second language pragmatics under certain circumstances is teachable, the 
targets of instruction in question all involved productive interaction skills, such 
as "discourse markers and strategies, pragmatic routines, speech acts, overall 
discourse characteristics, and pragmatic comprehension" (ibid. 397).  
In fact, exploring one of the directions suggested by Foster-Cohen (2000) and 
(2004) for the development of a Pragmatics of SLA, we look at pragmatics less 
from a socio-cultural perspective and focus on detailed pragmatic processes. 
While most studies in interlanguage pragmatics investigate cross-linguistic 
pragmatic variation and the cross-linguistic contrast, we focus on low-level 
regular – potentially universal – pragmatic processes involved in deriving the 
propositional form of an utterance. Interestingly, we will see that this new 
perspective also sheds new light on interlanguage pragmatics.  
Furthermore, our interest does not lie in L2 learners' productive pragmatic 
behavior in spoken or written discourse but rather in the pragmatic processes 
required for their receptive skills. Measuring receptive skills, of course, in any 
case requires a significant amount of interpretation, even with very precise 
measurement tools. The challenge for this study was, therefore, designing a 
means to infer receptive skills economically by benefitting from people's 
productive behavior. 
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2.2 Reference assignment: a pragmatic task 
In the classical sense, defining pragmatics, as opposed to semantics, has been 
understood via the involvement of context. Anything that is "context-specific 
inferred meaning" thus belonged to pragmatics (Carston 2009: 12). More 
recently, however, pragmatists have come to accept that the line between 
semantics and pragmatics is not drawn easily (see Carston 2002 for a 
discussion). The literature has thus moved from the ‘what is said' vs. ‘what is 
meant' distinction to the ‘explicit' vs. ‘implicit' distinction, where the determining 
factor is the type and quantity of inferences required. Anything that can be seen 
as a logical development of an utterance U is therefore to be seen as explicit 
while all other inferred communicated content should be regarded implicit 
In this study, we adopt the contextualist position that reference assignment, 
belonging to the explicit meaning of an utterance, involves inferencing as well 
and thus is a pragmatic process. Wilson, e.g., assumes that reference 
assignment is not an automatic semantically triggered process and "involves 
the retrieval or construction of an appropriate conceptual representation, one 
that uniquely identifies the intended referent." (Wilson 1992: 177). Reference 
assignment is also said to involve saturation and free enrichment (Carston 
2009) that allows the listener to correctly understand an utterance such as the 
coffee is cold to be explicated as the coffee that I last brewed is too cold to be 
enjoyed. The process of saturation, here, allows her to identify which coffee is 
meant (the coffee that I last brewed) whereas free enrichment provides the 
logical enrichment of the linguistic code to make the otherwise trivial information 
of the utterance relevant. While free enrichment remains essentially outside the 
scope of non-pragmatic theories of meaning, we rest on the fairly 
uncontroversial assumption that reference assignment involves saturation and 
as such requires a pragmatic process. It therefore qualifies as an explicature, 
i.e. a pragmatically saturated component of (propositional) meaning (see 
Carston 2002). 
2.3 SLA and age 
Age has been a hotly debated topic in the literature especially within the context 
of the Critical Period Hypothesis (CPH). Since our interest mostly concerns the 
entire lifespan and therefore goes beyond the Criticial Period, (which, according 
to Long, 1990, is age 12-13, if at all there is any) we will not, devote much space 
to the issue in this chapter. Nonetheless, the CPH debate has triggered a 
number of noteworthy studies that shed light on the age effect and whose 
findings are generally accepted. E.g., there seem to be patterns that apply to 
older versus younger learners in terms of learning rate as well as type of 
learning. Chandler (2006) cites that younger learners have been found to rely 
more on memory ability and incidental learning whereas older learners can be 
more analytical about their learning and draw on their aptitude for explicit 
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learning. He concludes that there might be multiple critical periods, which affect 
different aptitudes or skills. Such an exploration could be especially instructive 
for this study to find out which aptitudes or critical periods are related to specific 
pragmatic skills such as reference assignment. 
Nonetheless, one must take into account that ‘age' can be understood in many 
different ways other than just chronology. It is one thing to think of age as a 
contributing factor to the brain's plasticity and another thing to think of age as a 
mix of social, emotional, psychological and cultural components, individually 
mixed in each learner (cf. Abello-Contesse et al. 2006). De Guerrero (2009) 
proposes the Vygotskian "Sociocultural Theory", suggesting that the role of age 
in second language development is less biological/maturational but rather 
psychological. Meanwhile, rather than seeing language and aging as a single-
trajectory phenomenon, authors like van Geert (2009) propose a more 
multimodal understanding of language development through the lifespan, 
providing a more comprehensive account (see also Wander et al. 2009). Age 
could also be seen as incidental and underlying cognitive functions such as 
working memory or fluid intelligence might actually present a more reliable 
factor of change. In Keysar (2007), e.g., working memory appears to be the 
deciding factor in perspective taking abilities.  
2.4 Age and pragmatic processing 
Recent research on reference assignment and pragmatic processing describes 
and compares the processing of reference among children and adults. One of 
the leading studies was conducted by Trueswell et al. (1999) and actually 
serves as a basis for this chapter. In the study, the authors show that garden-
path sentences leading to ambiguous referential contexts are processed 
differently by children aged 5 in comparison to their adult counterparts. In a 
situation where the participants are instructed to Put the frog on the napkin in 
the box, in a configuration where there are two frogs (one frog sitting on a napkin 
and the other one with no other property), children tend to be misled more often 
than adults and interpret the modifying sub clause as a prepositional phrase. 
They claim that as a result of a less efficient pragmatic system children, unlike 
adults, are unable to use contextual material to revise their initial misreading 
due to verb argument structure biases.  
In a follow-up study, Wexler (2001) attributes the children's poorer performance 
to a lack of a semantic understanding of the definite determiner the. He suggests 
that what the study of Trueswell et al. shows is that, while children's processing 
is very similar to that of adults, what is crucially different for children is that they 
do not have the "uniqueness condition of N" in e.g. the N (2011: 25). This means 
that children use and understand the N to mean that there is at least one N but 
not that there is only one. On a more general level, Wexler argues that 
psycholinguistic assumptions often take for granted that children already have 
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acquired the linguistic system presenting the grounds for any kind of linguistic 
theory. In other words, how can an incomplete or underdeveloped semantic 
system successfully cater to pragmatic processes? 
The response to Trueswell (1999) by Meroni & Crain (2011) states that both 
children and adults combine the Theta Assignment Principle and the Principle 
of Referential Success to decode a sentence: while parsing, they a) "assign the 
theta roles associated with a verb as soon as possible, all other things being 
equal" (ibid. 44) and then b) "abandon structural analyses that do not refer to 
entities represented in its current model of the domain of discourse" (ibid. 46). 
This would explain why the napkin is initially interpreted as the destination 
prepositional phrase but later on corrected to be understood as a modifier in 
order to satisfy the principles of Referential Theory. What distinguishes children 
from adults, in their view, is simply the fact that these principles are not yet as 
automated in children as they are in adults. 1 
Musolino & Gualmini (2001) also favor the view that while sentence-processing 
abilities between adults and children may differ quantitatively, "they do not differ 
qualitatively" in some parsing phenomena. In their work on the disambiguation 
of quantified NPs, they propose that children's interpretation of every changes 
over time to become more like the non-isomorphic interpretation reading of 
adults. Sentences like Every horse didn't jump over the fence, in time, will no 
longer be understood to mean that none of the horses jumped over the fence. 
Looking at coreference assignment, Reinhart also assesses that the quality of 
processing is not different between children and adults: "children's parser, being 
innate, is identical to that of adults … The difference between children and 
adults, in this case, is only in the size of their working memory" (2011: 169). 
She, thus, attributes the empirical differences between the two groups to 
working memory capacity, which is smaller in children in comparison with their 
adult counterparts. 
The debate crystallizes around the question of whether the difference between 
children and adults lies in the process itself or in the way the process is 
hampered or accelerated. One could also formulate the question as having to 
do with either the development of the processing machine or rather with the 
working of the machine's elements. While Trueswell et al. believe that the 
process of, at least, reinterpretation differs between children and adults, their 
critics claim that it is a matter of either semantics or other processing resources 
such as automatization or working memory. Crucially, the critics argue that 
children act similarly to adults in the given tasks but lack the processing power 
to run the same calculations. 
                                         
1  This theory would also account for how the disambiguation of garden-path counts as pragmatic 
explicature: if the Principle of Referential Success essentially inhibits or blocks syntactic 
derivation, a pragmatic input is required to resolve the syntactic ambiguity. 
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2.5 Pragmatic processing and L2 
In the same vein but from a slightly different perspective, one could ask whether 
such pragmatic processes differ not only when comparing children to adults but 
even when comparing native speakers to L2 learners of a language. Work on 
cognitive processes involved in disambiguation within SLA is gaining more 
attention in recent research. By means of a word-by-word self-paced reading 
and grammaticality judgment task of garden-path sentences with temporary 
subject/object ambiguities, Juffs (2004) found that speakers of L2 English seem 
to parse garden-path sentences as English native speakers do in that they show 
a similar sensitivity to ambiguities in terms of increased processing difficulty. 
However, it remains unclear what exactly underlies this difficulty in 
disambiguation for both groups. On the one hand, it is not clear what contributes 
to the "strength" of a garden-path effect, i.e. the degree to which the target 
sentence enforces initial erroneous interpretations and to what extent it makes 
disambiguation more effortful for either group. On the other hand, it remains to 
be discovered in which part of the process the difficulty arises. 
There are several views about how the disambiguation in garden-path 
sentences differs between L2 learners and native speakers. Some claim that it 
has to do with a fundamental processing difference in that L2 learners rely 
"largely on lexical-semantic and pragmatic information" (Roberts 2012: 177). L2 
learners, therefore, are said to operate in a way that differs structurally from that 
of native speakers. Clahsen & Felser (2006) claim that while processing 
differences between L1 children and adults are explained in terms of cognitive 
developmental factors, L2 learners' increased difficulty would lie in a ‘shallower' 
syntactic representation system. Meanwhile, there are scholars who believe in 
a more quantitative rather than qualitative account and attribute the difference 
to L2 learners' lacking proficiency and to the (resulting) processing limitations 
(e.g. Juffs 2004, see above; Dekydtspotter et al. 2006). 
From a Pragmatics of SLA perspective, reference assignment in typologically 
close languages like German and English should give rise to positive transfer in 
the sense of Selinker (1969, 1983). The integration of contextual assumptions 
when assigning referents to an ambiguous NP in L2, thus, should be similar to 
that in L1. As a result, assuming L2 proficiency is not a hindrance, a direct 
transfer, or cross-linguistic influence (Jarvis & Pavlenko 2008), of pragmatic 
abilities from L1 to L2 is expected. All other things being equal, it could 
legitimately be expected that low-level explicatures of the type discussed above 
should benefit from prior knowledge and skills developed in L1.  
However, one of the central tenets in cognitively-grounded pragmatic 
frameworks such as Relevance Theory is that pragmatic processes, such as 
the derivation of explicatures, is subject to non-linguistic, cognitive influences. 
Therefore, all other things are not equal. An interlocutor's pragmatic abilities 
should reflect the impact on their cognitive abilities. To the extent that L2 and 
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age might constitute such cognitive obstacles, the central hypothesis of this 
chapter runs against transfer theory and predicts that learners' performance on 
pragmatic tasks are inferior to those of L1 speakers and that the gap between 
the two becomes bigger across the lifespan. 
2.6 Pragmatic processing and perspective taking 
Reference assignment relies on different kinds of information to draw the 
explicature. One element of the referential disambiguation process crucially 
hinges on what is referred to as Perspective Taking. It describes the alignment 
of the cognitive environment between speakers and hearers. Part of the 
pragmatic activity deployed during a verbal exchange deals with mutual 
knowledge, that is both interactants have to construct a mutual representation 
of each other's cognitive environment (including a representation of the other 
person's representation of one's cognitive environment). With regard to 
reference assignment, a very simple rule applies: only those referents that are 
mutually cognitively manifest (in the terminology developed by Sperber & 
Wilson 1995) can be the objects of discourse. As a result, interactants have to 
keep track of each other's cognitive environment to draw the right explicatures. 
In a series of experiments, Keysar and colleagues (1998, 2000, 2007) 
investigated reference assignment in children (around age 5) and adults in an 
experimental paradigm where participants receive instructions to move objects 
from an instructor who does not have access to the same referents as the 
subject. The authors assume an egocentric bias, i.e. addressees by default first 
consider possible referents within their own cognitive environment. Therefore, 
referential disambiguation of this type, similar to the garden-path task, also 
requires a revision of one's initial interpretation. Subjects have to align their 
cognitive environment to that of the instructor in order to pick the correct objects. 
Keysar and colleagues showed that whereas adults typically revise their initial 
egocentric bias, children are less likely to do so.  
Keysar's attributes the difference between children and adults to a matter of, 
what we shall call, cognitive saturation. He writes (2007: 75) 
[T]he consideration of other's beliefs is not automatic. Instead, it is an effortful process, 
which requires cognitive resources and is easily disrupted. If this is true, then people's 
interpretations should depend on the resources available to their working memory.  
Adults thus outperform children on disambiguation explicatures because they 
have more resources to allocate to the pragmatic adjustment that is needed to 
override the initial egocentric bias. This model predicts that any kind of cognitive 
pressure is likely to result in a weaker performance in the given pragmatic task. 
It allows us to move away from the children-vs.-adults distinction and formulate 
a broader generalization: from a lifespan perspective, learners' processing of 
contextual assumptions in the course of aligning their cognitive environment 
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with that of the interlocutor is expected to correlate with changes affecting 
cognitive (i.e. not only linguistic) abilities over time. 
3. Research question 
The study in this chapter is based on two of the previously mentioned 
psycholinguistic studies, briefly summarized as follows:  
3.1 Study 1: referent disambiguation in garden-path sentences 
Trueswell et al. (1999) set out with the premise that readers usually process 
sentences incrementally. That is, adult readers do not need to have read the 
whole sentence in order to have an idea of what the end of a sentence will more 
or less contain. This also means that readers occasionally make incorrect 
commitments prematurely. Therefore, readers have the ability to ‘foresee' parts 
of a sentence that is still ahead and, if necessary, to revise wrong commitments 
that were made in the process. Trueswell et al. investigated how this ability is 
represented in young children as opposed to adults, in particular in connection 
with reference assignment processes. To do this, they used an eye-tracking 
system to study the children's online sentence processing, based on the 
assumption that fixation data and eye-movement patterns can be used to 
quantify processing difficulty. Trueswell et al. adapt the context-sensitive 
pragmatic disambiguation principle known as the Referential Principle, which 
purports that processing commitment can be aided by the context so long as it 
does not run against the lexical bias (e.g. verbs that have a strong VP 
attachment). It was to be seen if children's understanding of a sentence was 
more pragmatic and contextually driven or rather more structurally driven than 
that of adults. 
In their experiment, the authors compared children's processing of instructions 
that consisted of temporarily ambiguous phrases such as "Put the frog on the 
napkin in the box" (1999: 96) with their unambiguous counterparts "Put the frog 
that's on the napkin in the box." They presented each of these target sentences 
with two possible visual contexts: condition 1) with 2 possible referents (one frog 
sitting on a napkin and one that was not) supported the interpretation of "on the 
napkin" as a NP modifier, whereas condition 2) with only one possible referent, 
according to the authors, encouraged a VP-modifier reading and thus they 
expected the children to move the (only) frog onto the empty napkin. The same 
experiment was conducted with adults. Trueswell et al. found that adults 
behaved according to the Referential Principle as had been predicted. 
Furthermore, it was confirmed that adults were able to cancel their initial 
incorrect commitment and made fewer errors than children. It also showed that 
young children of age 5 preferred to interpret on the napkin as the destination 
of the verb of movement. In addition, they did not revise their initial commitment 
as willingly. As a result, they chose the correct referent in the 2-referent 
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condition at chance. Assuming that children also interpret utterances 
incrementally, one could say that they show a significantly lower tendency to 
revise their initially assigned referent. 
3.2 Study 2: referent disambiguation in perspective-taking task 
Keysar et al. (2000) investigated reference-assignment preferences and the 
follow-up study by Epley, Morewedge & Keysar (2004) in particular looked at 
that of children (aged between 4 and 12) in comparison to adults. However, here 
the disambiguation processes that govern the assignment of a referent to an 
ambiguous definite NP involved the correct alignment of speaker and hearer 
cognitive environment. The focus in this study, thus, lay on Perspective Taking 
and the egocentric bias. Keysar et al. started out from the macro-level 
assumption that communication hinges crucially for both speaker and 
addressee on establishing mutually known information2 as it constitutes a 
prerequisite for successful comprehension, and they investigated the traces of 
this cognitive alignment process between two interactants from a micro-level 
approach by identifying how subjects assign referents in certain ambiguous 
contexts. 
To do this, the authors had subjects participate in a referential communication 
game which involved moving around objects within a vertical array of slots 
according to the instructions of a confederate, who, acting as the director, was 
seated opposite the participant, across a see-through bookshelf and, therefore, 
had a different perspective. While all slots were visible from the participant's 
perspective, the experimenters occluded some of the slots from the director's 
view, which forced the participants to keep in mind that the director did not see 
all of the objects they could see. For example, in a sentence like move the small 
candle one slot down, there would be three candles of different sizes and the 
smallest one would be occluded. The correct referent would thus be the 
medium-sized candle as it was the smaller one in the director's view—assuming 
that he could not possibly mean one of the objects he did not see. However, if 
participants considered the instructions egocentrically, the authors predicted 
that they would initially consider all candles as referentially valid, including the 
occluded object. All the while during this game, the participants' eye as well as 
head movements were tracked to determine their gaze. Indeed, the study 
showed that adults' initial eye movements were fastest to the occluded object 
and that they fixated the occluded object longer in critical trials than in the control 
condition. Keysar et al. concluded that, even though the participants knew which 
slots were occluded, the egocentric bias overrode that knowledge (cf. Keysar et 
al. 2000: 35) leading to erroneous referential disambiguation. 
                                         
2  Where mutually known information is understood to correspond to a representation in the hearer’s 
cognitive environment of that of the speaker and vice-versa. 
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In a follow-up study that compared the behavior of children ranging from 4 to 12 
years of age to that of adults, they found that the children reached for objects 
more egocentrically than did their adult counterparts. Whereas adults also 
committed errors in the critical trials, theirs were significantly fewer than those 
of children. Furthermore, the number of errors was significantly related to the 
participants' age with fewer errors being committed the older participants got. In 
terms of looking at the egocentric and thus incorrect object, adults and children 
were equally quick. However, adults were shown to be quicker when it came to 
correcting the initial egocentric choice and subsequently better at picking the 
correct object, i.e. at pragmatically revising their initial reference assignment. 
The authors conclude that "[a]dults and children do not appear to differ in the 
automatic processing of their own perspective but do differ in the controlled 
adjustment required to accommodate another's differing perspective." (Epley 
2004: 765) This is in line with the findings of Trueswell et al. where the adults 
pragmatically outperformed the children. 
Epley et al. draw a direct relation between a strong egocentric bias and the 
participant's high attentional load as well as when the motivation to make 
accurate judgments is low. According to the authors, therefore, the difference in 
performance on the tasks between children and adults is not related to 
differences in the automated processes themselves but rather in the mental 
processes that control or affect those processes. It remains unclear, however, 
in what way the ability of perspective taking improves with age. Epley et al. make 
a tentative suggestion that performance could improve as the process becomes 
more automated: with practice and experience growing children's 
disambiguation processes become more "efficient and effortless" (766).  
3.3 Pragmatic processes in reference assignment 
In both studies described above the adults outperformed the children in the 
respective pragmatic tasks. Meanwhile, the children were less able to revise 
their initial commitment and selected the incorrect object in the critical trials. 
This is a strong indication that what drives hearers' pragmatic ability to 
disambiguate sentences correctly is either inexistent or underdeveloped in 
children. On the one hand, one could argue that children have not yet acquired 
or developed that which would have prevented the misreading of the utterance. 
On the other hand, one could say that the children's pragmatic system is not 
‘powerful' enough to revise the initial erroneous commitments. This would entail 
either that children's pragmatic machine is not automated enough or that their 
pragmatic machine does not have access to enough cognitive resources. 
To investigate this matter further, the study described in this chapter applies 
similar experiments to second language learners. It is to be seen whether 
solving reference disambiguation tasks in an L2 is anything like what has been 
found for L1. Understanding whether the difference in pragmatic processing 
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between native speakers and L2 learners is qualitative or quantitative in nature 
could shed light on the difference between children and adults. If we assume 
that it is qualitative, we would find that the pragmatic process of reference 
assignment is something that is acquired or perfected at some point and 
thereafter stable across all levels of cognitive demands put on the system, 
including aging. The acquisition of pragmatics would have to be considered a 
‘developmental' matter. However, if the difference is attributed to a quantitative 
difference, one expects that adults and L1 speakers outperform non-native 
speakers like they do children due to a different access to cognitive resources 
and assuming that non-nativeness is a stressor. In this case, additional 
cognitive stress would result in more errors—even in L2 adults—and we would 
have to say that the acquisition of the pragmatic machine is a matter of ‘cognitive 
saturation'. The research question pursued in this chapter, in line with the 
ongoing debates on whether variation in pragmatic processes is either 
qualitatively or quantitatively grounded, asks whether the pragmatic processes 
in question are affected by L2 towards the ‘developmental' or rather the 
‘saturational' take. The following section will outline how the two original studies 
were adapted towards that end. 
4. Research design 
For the two experiments described in this chapter, over 150 native speakers of 
German were recruited, which provided a convenience-sample representation 
of the population. Eligible participants were selected according to an online 
survey tool, by which it was ensured that they knew, by means of their personal 
evaluation, some English but did not speak it as their mother tongue. The entire 
sample of eligible participants consisted of participants aged 10-11, 15-16, 20-
29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79 and 80 and above, each age group 
consisting of 20 people3. To replicate the experimental setup from the original 
studies and yet be able to accommodate as many subjects as we did, we 
reconstructed two computer-assisted tests using E-Prime. That way, the stimuli 
were set and reset by the program automatically and did not have to be 
construed manually. This allowed for conditions to be maximally similar across 
all participants and testing conditions. 
In both experiments, the participants are walked through the task with slides 
explaining to them what they needed to do in German. They were allowed to 
repeat this part as often as they wished. Two to three trial slides, during which 
the computer program validated their response, ensured that they had 
completely understood the task before starting the test, all the while giving them 
the option of returning to the explanatory slides.4   
                                         
3  As some of the participants aged 80 and above dropped out, this age group was smaller. 
4  In order to ensure that the participants of all levels of English could perform the task well, they 
were introduced to all of the objects that would appear in the test slides along with their names in 
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The experiments were conducted between fall of 2011 and summer of 2012 
with a mobile computer lab set up at the University of Zurich campus. For 
participants who were not mobile, the assistants arranged to set up the lab in 
the participants' homes. Subjects were compensated with a monetary gift. The 
experimental battery run on the participants included the two experiments 
presented in this chapter as well as those conducted for two other studies 
presented in this volume. The experiments ran on a laptop computer and a 
wireless mouse to gather participants' responses. For both experiments of the 
present chapter, the data include the location of the subjects' first clicks to 
measure their accuracy in pointing to the correct referent for the target NP as 
well as their response time, i.e. the duration between stimulus onset and their 
first click. The order of the tasks was randomized so that cross-design effect 
could be controlled for. 
4.1 Procedure experiment 1: reference assignment in garden-path 
sentences 
In the experiment based on Trueswell (1999), the stimuli displayed 4 clickable 
objects. Upon hearing the instruction, e.g. Put the frog on the napkin in the box, 
they had to click first on the correct referent (the correct frog among up to two 
possible ones) and then the correct destination, in this case the box. As seen 
above, the critical instructions consisted of a garden-path sentence and 
contained a temporary ambiguity in that, as long as in the box was not heard, 
on the napkin could be mistaken for a verbal adjunct phrase rather than a 
nominal modifier phrase. Based on the study by Trueswell (1999), the 
experiment investigates the subjects' ability to correct their initial misreading of 
the garden-path sentence as well as the effort it takes them to do so in L2. The 
conditions varied in terms of how many possible frogs there were (1 or 2) and 
whether the sentence was syntactically ambiguous or not, i.e. introducing the 
modifier phrase with or without that. 
4.2 Procedure experiment 2: reference assignment and perspective 
taking 
By the same token, in the experiment based on Keysar's study (1997), the 
subjects were presented with a virtual bookshelf on the computer screen and 
were asked to imagine a speaking pig standing behind it. For each stimulus, 
there were several objects placed in some the bookshelf's slots. A number of 
these, however, were covered on the pig's side and the subjects had to factor 
in that the pig neither saw nor knew what objects were placed in the covered 
slots. The task, thus, consisted in subjects hearing an instruction such as Put 
the bear above the duck and picking the correct referent among the possible 
                                         
both written as well as in spoken form. E.g. they would see a bear along with the word “bear” on 
the screen and simultaneously hear somebody say “this is a bear”. 
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bears. While the sentence in itself was syntactically unambiguous and there was 
always only one correct referent (all other objects were either not bears or 
covered on the pig's side), the instruction remained ambiguous to the subjects 
to the extent that they did not consider the pig's perspective.  
The test was run on three different conditions. In the first one, the subjects heard 
an instruction that was unambiguous and where there was only one possible 
object to be moved. The second condition, hereafter ambiguous condition, 
consisted of an instruction where there were at least two of the kind of objects 
that the subjects were asked to move on the screen, however, only one was not 
occluded from the pig's perspective and thus there was only one possible 
correct response. In the third condition, hereafter biased condition, the 
participants heard instructions that included an attribute to distinguish between 
three possibly correct objects, such as "the small bear". Thus, in the biased 
condition, subjects heard commands such as put the small bear above the duck 
when there were three bears of different sizes on the screen but the smallest 
one was occluded. The difference between the ambiguous condition and the 
biased one is that the latter biases the subjects towards one of the objects on 
the screen (in this case the smallest bear) whereas the former does not. 
Therefore, the corrective measure required of the subjects' pragmatics is higher 
in the biased condition, which is why we also expect them to make more 
mistakes. All of the three conditions in Experiment 2 were tested in both the 
subjects' L1 and L2.  
5. Results and discussion 
In accordance with the view by which reference assignment is a pragmatic 
process, which should have been acquired within the first five years or so, L2 
reference assignment should prove to be a fairly basic, automated task and 
should not pose a great challenge for the participants. While our participants 
performed well on the two reference assignment tasks and made very few 
mistakes, our data still allow us to tease out some interesting and distinctive L2 
patterns.5  
5.1 Experiment 1 
Since the participants' overall mean error rate is very low, we can say that 
assigning reference in L2 remains a fairly straightforward task, even in a second 
language. Comparing the different conditions, however, we see that the 
subjects' error rates in response to temporarily ambiguous instructions is three 
times as high as for unambiguous ones. The difference in means was .801 and 
                                         
5  In this section, the description of the data gathered from the experiments will primarily be 
interpreted by testing the equality of means. However, it should be noted that since there was a 
ceiling effect, it is difficult to determine the central tendency and therefore the results from the 
statistical analysis should be accepted with due reserve at this stage. 
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highly significant by a paired-sample t-test (t=6.117, df=155, p<.001). If we hark 
back to the original study, this is reminiscent of the behavior of the 5-year olds, 
who in the same condition performed at chance level.6 This shows not only that 
the ambiguously phrased instructions were actually perceived as ambiguous by 
some (if not all) subjects but not all could overcome this temporary ambiguity 
correctly. This is in line with our hypothesis that pragmatic disambiguation 
processes – in this case overcoming temporary ambiguity – in a second 
language, even as adults, is more prone to erroneous performance. 
In terms of context, participants committed about twice as many errors in 
ambiguous sentences when there were two referents as when there was only 
one referent. The difference in means was 1.288 and highly significant by a 
paired-sample t-test (t=7.022, df=155, p<.001). Comparing this to the data in 
the original study, we again see that our subjects reflect the tendency of children 
to be confused about picking the correct referent in 2-Referent stimuli. This 
would also support our hypothesis. The difference in response accuracy 
between conditions is illustrated in Figure 1 below. It shows a stark contrast 
between the only condition that requires pragmatic disambiguation of referent 
(2Ref Amb, which stands for 2 referents with syntactic ambiguity) and all other 
conditions (1 referent with or without syntactic ambiguity or 2 referents without 
syntactic ambiguity). 
Figure 1: Boxplot of error rate per condition in Experiment 1. 
                                         
6  Adults in the original study only experienced the instructions as garden-path sentences in the 
1-Referent ambiguous condition and only committed errors in their reading of on the napkin, 
interpreting it as a PP instead of an MP, but not when assigning reference (Trueswell 1999: 
116-117). 
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A comparison of reaction-time means for ambiguous versus unambiguous 
stimuli with 2 referents shows only a minimal difference with a 28 millisecond 
increase for the ambiguous stimuli. A paired-sample t-test, however, shows that 
the difference is not significant (t=0.624, df=155, p=0.533). The difference 
between 1- and 2-referent contexts with ambiguous instructions provides a 
starker contrast in that the latter condition caused the subjects to take 242 
milliseconds longer to solve the task. This difference by a paired-sample t-test 
proved to be significant (t=6.419, df=155, p<.001). If response times are any 
indication at all of cognitive processing, the data from the response times 
supports the claim that reference disambiguation explicatures are a costly 
cognitive process and slows our participants down. However, while there is a 
slight indication that it does appear in L2 English, the garden-path effect remains 
quite weak. 
Looking at the accuracy data in relation to age, the participants show a sharp 
increase in accuracy with increased age up to the age of around 20, which is 
probably due to the proficiency level of younger participants. After that the 
pattern is less clear. While response times get better as participants get older, 
the participants' speed at solving the task decreases with age starting from age 
30. Table 1 summarizes the exact figures of the means for each age group. 
Using a one-way ANOVA to test for variance of means between the participant 
groups aged 10 to 79, a significant difference can be found, both for accuracy, 
F(7, 144) = 3.894, p<.001, and response times, F(7, 147) = 7.862, p<.001. 
 
Age in years 10-12 15-16 20-20 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 
Error rate in % 1.641 0.802 0.254 0.219 0.578 0.212 0.212 0.809 0.083 
Response Times 
in ms 
1846 1601 1376 1709 2135 1917 2087 2576 2282 
Table 1: Error rate and RT for each age group in Experiment 1. 
The data shows that the subjects' behavior, even though they are all notably 
older than five years, echoes that of the children from the original study, as 
expected by our hypothesis. It also confirms that L2 pragmatic processes are 
affected through the lifespan both in terms of accuracy and speed, as there 
seems to be a positive correlation between age and pragmatic processing effort 
and accuracy. Moreover, the more difficult a task is, the more likely it is to elicit 
an erroneous response: despite an increase in processing time, performance is 
still poorer. 
5.2 Experiment 2 
Comparing the results from the original studies by Keysar (2004) and Trueswell 
(1999), we see that the cognitive environment alignment task elicited many 
more errors from the adult subjects than did the disambiguation of garden-path 
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sentences. In Keysar (2000), the subjects actually reached for the occluded 
object in 23% of the critical conditions. Our data reflects this increase in 
difficulty, showing an error rate on the first click, i.e. reference assignment of the 
target NP, that is more than six times higher than that of Experiment 1. 
Nonetheless, we see that reference assignment here, too, remains a fairly easy 
task for the participants and that they perform well overall. In fact, our 
participants' performance-level is better than that of the subjects originally 
tested by Keysar7. 
This difference between our results and the original study's might be explained 
by the design of the task: due to the virtual interaction displayed on screen, the 
participants might have developed a strategy that merely filtered out those 
objects in the stimuli that appeared in front of a gray background (and thus were 
to be considered occluded). Yet, since the aim of this section is to measure the 
subjects' contextual disambiguation from a linguistic point of view, even filtering 
out the gray slots can be considered a stressor and helps evaluating the 
subjects' referential pragmatic skills. 
Considering the different conditions, we see that all participants had a perfect 
score when assigning reference in the unambiguous control condition in L2, as 
was expected. The data is more informative when we look at the two other 
conditions: it shows that participants committed more errors in the ambiguous 
condition and even more errors in the biased condition. The difference of mean 
error rates was 0.061 (with 0.112 for the biased condition) and highly significant 
by a paired-sample t-test (t=7.075, df=155, p<.001).8 We see that the biased 
condition has elicited more than twice as many errors as did the simple 
ambiguous condition. Assuming that the biased condition posed a greater 
cognitive load, the data shows that reference assignment under these 
circumstances is more difficult. This is in line with Keysar's finding (2007: 75) 
that "with a high external [cognitive] load subjects were much more egocentric 
than with low external load, and behaved like subjects who have a low working 
memory capacity."9 To what extent solving the task in L2 involves an ‘external' 
rather than ‘internal' load remains to be determined. However, one argument 
would be to treat L2 cognitive interference as interference that is generated by 
the language processing system itself and would therefore qualify as a form of 
internal load. The following graphs illustrate the subjects' response accuracy 
and places side by side their performance in their L1 vs. their L2. As we see, 
performance contrasts strikingly between L2 and L1, specifically on the most 
                                         
7  Children in Epley, Keysar et al. (2004) reached for the hidden referent 2.08 (mean) times out of 
4. 
8   The same testing procedure revealed a significant difference between the simple ambiguous and 
the unambiguous conditions in both languages as participants consistently achieved a perfect 
score in the latter. 
9  In the 2007 study, Keysar manipulated the subject’s “external load” by e.g. having them keep in 
mind several sets of numbers while following instructions. 
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demanding condition, where participants not only need to reconstruct the 
speaker's cognitive environment through reference assignment but they also 
have to deal with an additional layer of ambiguity due to the presence of a 
modifier in the target NP. 
 
Figure 2: Boxplot of error rate per condition in Experiment 2, L1. 
Figure 3: Boxplot of error rate per condition in Experiment 2, L2. 
When examining the participants' response times in the two ambiguous 
conditions, subjects appear to take longer when dealing with the instructions in 
the biased condition by nearly 350 milliseconds. The difference in means, here 
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too, is highly significant by a paired sample t-test (t=5.201, df=155, p<.001), 
showing that the response times for the biased condition are significantly longer 
than in the simple ambiguous condition. This, again, supports the assumption 
that the biased condition requires more processing effort and underlines the 
findings from the accuracy data. These results seem to indicate that as the 
demand on pragmatic processing increases, the pressure exerted by L2 
impedes the processes more heavily. This is in line with our observations in 
Experiment 1 where a clear contrast in accuracy between the 2 referentially 
ambiguous conditions is obtained as the condition involving a syntactic 
ambiguity suffers more.  
Looking at the variation in relation to age, we notice interestingly that, contrary 
to what we observed above in Experiment 1, there is no significant difference 
among the groups in terms of accuracy by a one-way ANOVA, F(7, 143) = 
1.514, p=0.166. Table 2 summarizes the exact figures of the means for each 
age group. When it comes to response times, however, one can see that while 
young participants up to age 29 increase in processing speed, this gradually 
declines with age: the youngest as well as the older groups take longer to 
respond than the subjects in their teens and late 30s. A one-way ANOVA has 
proven the group differences to be significant, F(7, 142) = 4.927, p < .001).  
 
Age in years 10-12 15-16 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 
Error rate in % 0.636 0.450 1.122 0.350 0.461 0.851 1.470 1.634 0.933 
Response 
Times in ms 
3249 2607 2058 2557 4129 3279 3990 4141 4082 
Table 2: Error rate and RT for each age group in Experiment 2. 
These results contrast with those observed in Experiment 1: one can detect two 
different types of reference assignment processes in L2. Although a preliminary 
analysis appears to be compatible with the general assumption that reference 
assignment is highly sensitive to cognitive load, it calls for a differentiated 
account of successful reference assignment processes across the lifespan in 
L2 (and possibly in L1), depending on the type of contextual information 
available.  
From a language learning perspective, our results point in an interesting 
direction as they indicate that the cognitive nature of pragmatic disambiguation 
processes makes them prone to fail on purely cognitive ground. In other words, 
the errors noted above do not seem to be explained by the cross-linguistic 
variation of reference explicatures, as we argue there is none in this case, but 
by the sheer cognitive overload experienced in L2 which affects the subjects' 
performance. While it would be interesting to apply the same test in the subject's 
L1 for control or to test their reference assignment skills by using reference 
markers other than determiners, the conclusion that solving pragmatic tasks 
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depends on the subjects' cognitive capacity gathers further support through the 
deterioration observed across age groups.  
In that sense, these findings offer a new take on interlanguage pragmatics. They 
indicate that the often noted under-performance in interlanguage pragmatics 
can at least in part be attributed to a shortage of cognitive resources and is not 
necessarily due to typological mismatches or other types of cross-linguistic 
influences. 
6. Conclusion 
To understand the implications of these results for applied linguistics, and 
language learning and language teaching in particular, one might wish to hark 
back to the question of the teachability of pragmatics as raised by Rose (2005). 
Answering how much should be taught will depend on how much is already 
there to begin with. Our results give us a glimpse of the complexity of the answer 
as we come to realize that there seems to be a clear gap between the 
competence that learners might have in EFL and their ability to use it. This 
echoes the critique voiced by Wexler (2001) that a clearer definition of the 
assumed linguistic systems must be provided, on the basis of which evidence 
of psycholinguistic and pragmatic behavior can be evaluated. In particular, our 
results indicate that despite their having access to a linguistic system which 
includes the appropriate rules of reference assignment, learners' pragmatics 
fails them. To put it in different words, there is nothing that could be taught 
regarding reference assignment to our participants which they do not already 
know. 
On the other side of the coin, our results also call into question more traditional 
views about pragmatic disambiguation where reference assignment would 
regarded as a unified process. Thus, a general statement such as the following: 
"pragmatic interpretations are not arbitrary. They are well motivated, ‘common-
sensical' and predictable. They therefore need not be learnt when we acquire a 
new language" (Ariel 2010: 44) will need to be rethought as reference 
disambiguation appears to involve different types of pragmatic processes, which 
is not surprising, but that these processes appear to have distinct cognitive 
profiles. In turn, those differences are affected differently by the cognitive 
pressure exerted by L2. Also, our study shows that even if some pragmatic 
processes such as reference assignment need not be learnt (or taught, for that 
matter), they are nonetheless affected when employed under certain cognitive 
constraints, such as in L2 or with increased age.  
The results gathered from this study have so far shown to be ambivalent in that 
reference assignment in ambiguous contexts in L2 English by native speakers 
of German is fairly accurate across the lifespan. Yet, a closer investigation of 
the specific processes shows that their pragmatic behavior echoes that of 
children in L1 English studies. Furthermore, different types of ambiguity seem 
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to call for different ways of disambiguating referents. The line of inquiry we wish 
to pursue from here, therefore, is one where the difference between 
perspective-based ambiguity and syntax-based ambiguity indicates that the two 
tasks activate different pragmatic processes, which are differently affected a) by 
the cognitive demands set by L2 and b) by the cognitive factors associated with 
aging.  
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